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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : ADEN, AMMAN, ANKARA, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BONN FOR CINCUSAFE, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DHAHRAN, FRANKFURT FOR LINDSEY AIR STATION, ATTN: DSC INTELLIGENCE, IDCA, HEADQUARTERS USAREUR HEIDELBERG, KARACHI, KHARTO KUWAIT, LONDON, MOGADISCIO, RABAT, TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, COMIDEASTFOR, DIA, CHUSMTM

FROM : Amembassy JIDDA

DATE: May 16, 1966

SUBJECT: Monthly Review for Saudi Arabia - April, 1966

REF :

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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Throughout April the Ambassador and other USG representatives continued to urge Faisal, Prince Sultan, and other Saudi officials to exercise patience and restraint while persisting in their efforts to resolve the Yemen impasse. This advice was also stressed by Assistant Secretary HARE who visited Riyadh April 30. Saudi concern about Egyptian troop concentrations in northwest Yemen, however, led to demands by Prince Sultan that the US or the UK sell or loan Saudi Arabia, on an emergency basis, at least one battery of anti-aircraft missiles. Although the USG informed Sultan that no Hawk missiles could be delivered before October, he asked that the USG "review" this decision in view of the importance he and the King attach to earlier delivery. At Sultan's request both the US and UK accelerated their destroyer visits to Saudi Arabia during April. COMIDEASTFOR Admiral MAURER also paid a visit to Sultan, helping lend additional credence to reiterated expressions of USG interest in Saudi Arabia's security.

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I. FOREIGN RELATIONS

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(Possibly in an attempt to give some substance to the King's support for ~~the~~ Kashmiri self-determination, Prince Sultan in his April 30 meeting with Ambassadors Hare and Eilts urged the USG to "adopt" the Kashmir issue but did not elaborate on this request.

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III. SAUDI-US RELATIONS

A. U.S. Continues to Caution Restraint

Although Nasser's March 22 speech and Cairo's increasing propaganda attacks on Saudi Arabia seemingly dimmed the possibilities for further high-level negotiations on Yemen, the USG continued during April to urge restraint on

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the Saudis and to encourage them to persist in attempts to resolve the impasse over interpretation of the Jidda Agreement.

BL(A)(S) [redacted] He assured the Saudis that the USG had no evidence of any current UAR intentions to launch an unprovoked attack against Saudi territory. The Ambassador also pointed out that the American Embassy in Cairo was making a parallel approach to UAR authorities and that Nasser did not seem to have closed the door entirely to further negotiations. This advice was reiterated when the Ambassador saw Sultan again on April 23.

On April 30, following the NEA Chiefs of Mission Conference in Beirut, Assistant Secretary HARE and the Ambassador had talks with the King, Sultan, Saqqaf, and other Saudi officials in Riyadh. The King reviewed the Yemen situation in familiar terms and sought the USG's assessment for Nasser's seeming change of attitude toward implementation of the Jidda Agreement. Ambassador Hare denied any special knowledge of Nasser's reasons but counselled the King to exercise patience and try to keep the dialogue with Nasser afloat.

(A)(3), (A)(5) [redacted]

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C. Naval Visits

In addition to emergency sales of air defense equipment, Sultan asked both the US and UK to accelerate the visit of naval units to Saudi Red Sea ports of Yenbu', Jidda, and especially Jizan. Taking advantage of a farewell call on Sultan April 11 by the Commanding Officer, Middle East Forces Rear Admiral Maurer, the Ambassador emphasized that the USG would do all it could to accelerate these visits to Jidda and Yenbu' during April and May. Sultan was pleased and appeared to accept Admiral Maurer's explanation why a naval visit to Jizan was navigationally unsafe. Subsequently the USS Lloyd Thomas called at Yenbu' April 15-17 and at Jidda April 18-20. The visit was particularly well received in Yenbu' where local civil and military authorities were highly cooperative and a significant percentage of the town's population visited the ship. A British destroyer and a frigate visited Jidda and Yenbu' respectively during the same period.

In view of the necessity of disappointing Sultan's demands for early missile deliveries, the visits of COMIDEASTFOR and of the USS Thomas helped lend

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additional credence to reiterated expressions of USG interest in Saudi Arabia's security. Sultan, on April 30, expressed to Ambassadors Hare and Eilts his hope that these accelerated destroyer visits could be continued beyond May.

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